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1 Introduction
In the banking literature, illiquidity and insolvency problems have been in-
tensively studied for decades. Illiquidity means that one financial institution
is not able to meet its short term liability via monetizing the future gains
from its long term projects — in other words, there’s a mismatch between
the time when the long term projects return and the time when its liability
is due, i.e. it’s ”cash flow trapped” but ”balance sheet solvent”. In contrast,
insolvency of a financial institution generally means that liabilities exceed
assets in its balance sheet, i.e. it is not able to meet due liabilities even by
perfectly monetizing the future gains from its long term projects. Existing
banking models usually focus on either problem. If a financial firm’s ailment
is diagnosed to be one of them, the solution is then (at least intuitively) clear.
For example, illiquid banks may be bailed out by central bank’s liquidity
injection (against their illiquid assets ”good” collateral, see Cao & Illing,
2009a, b), and insolvent banks have to be closed down in order to avoid
contagion (see Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2004).
Since mid-2007, the world has seen one of the worst financial crises in history,
which has stolen millions of jobs and held the entire global economy to
ransom. As is observed in the past two years, one prominent feature about
this crisis is the ambiguity in the financial institutions’ health, especially
the daunting question whether the problem for the large banks is illiquidity
or insolvency. Financial innovation in the past two decades doesn’t only
help improve market efficiency, but also creates high complexity (hence,
asymmetric information) which blurs the boundary between illiquidity and
insolvency. The over complicated financial products, as Gorton (2009) states,
finally ”could not be penetrated by most investors or counterparties in the
financial system to determine the location and size of the risks.” For example,
subprime mortgages, a financial innovation from which the current crisis
broke out, were designed to finance riskier long-term borrowers via short-
term funding. So when the trend of continuing US house price appreciation
started to stagger and giant investment banks ran into trouble, the trouble
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seemed to be a mere illiquidity problem — as long as house prices were to
increase in the future, the long-term yields of subprime mortgage-related
assets would be juicy as well. However, since the location and size of the
risks in these complicated financial products could not be fully perceived
even by the designer banks themselves, there was a probability that these
financial institutions were insolvent. In this vague scenario banks could
hardly get sufficient liquidity from market and the crisis erupted.
These events bring new challenges to both market practitioners and banking
regulators. If there’s no ambiguity between illiquidity and insolvency, con-
ventional wisdom works well: if the problem is just illiquidity, then liquidity
regulation works perfectly — banks can get enough liquidity from the cen-
tral bank putting their long-term assets as collateral, since the high yields
from these assets will return in the future with certainty. If the problem
is insolvency, equity holding can be a self-sufficient solution for the banks
to eliminate their losses. However, if there’s uncertainty about the banks’
trouble, things become complicated — banks cannot get enough liquidity
because the collateral, in the presence of insolvency risk, is no longer consid-
ered to be good. Therefore, liquidity regulation may fail. On the other hand,
equity requirements may be inefficient as well because the co-existence of
the two problems make equity holding even costlier. This paper hopes to
shed some light on understanding the market failure and designing proper
regulatory rules with a compact and flexible model.
1.1 Summary of the paper
In this paper, banks are intermediaries financing entrepreneurs’ short-term
(safe) and long-term (risky) projects via short-term deposit contracts, as in
Diamond & Rajan (2006). Illiquidity is modelled in Cao & Illing (2009a):
some fraction of risky projects turns out to be realized late. The aggregate
share of late projects is endogenous; it depends on the incentives of financial
intermediaries to invest in risky, illiquid projects. This endogeneity captures
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the feedback from liquidity provision to risk taking incentives of financial
intermediaries.
Unlike in models with pure illiquidity or insolvency problems, in the inter-
mediate period the market participants only observe the aggregate amount
of early returns from the risky projects. However, they don’t know whether
these risky assets are just illiquid (i.e. the majority of high yield risky projects
will return late), or whether the banks are insolvent (i.e. the substantial
amount of the risky projects will fail in the next period). The introduction of
such ambiguity has both significant impacts on equilibrium outcomes and
new implications for banking regulation.
Given the same structure of the banking game as in Cao & Illing (2008,
2009a), the equilibria in this extended model are similar: two types of pure
strategy equilibria — the banks coordinate to be risky when the sun always
shines and be prudent when it always rains, and a mixed strategy equi-
librium for intermediate pi. However, the gap between the expected return
from the risky projects in the good state and that in the bad state gets higher
with the uncertainty on the true problem — asset price is more inflated
in the good state because of the probability that the risky assets are just
illiquid, while asset price is more depressed in the bad state because of the
probability that the banks are going to be insolvent. The bigger gap makes
the interval for mixed strategy equilibrium wider in current setting, making
free-riding more attractive (more excessive liquidity supply when time is
good).
We derive some new insights for banking regulation. The solution for the
pure illiquidity risk case, as proposed in Cao & Illing (2009b), is to have
ex ante liquidity requirements with ex post conditional bailout. This is not
sufficient now. The reason is simple: because the central bank doesn’t have
superior knowledge to that of market participants, i.e. it isn’t able to dis-
tinguish between illiquidity and insolvency risks, the value of the banks’
collateral in the bad state cannot be as high as that at that in the good state.
Therefore, the banks cannot get sufficient liquidity from the central bank in
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the bad state even they do observe the ex ante liquidity requirement. A bank
run is, thus, not avoided any more.
This finding suggests that the additional insolvency problem implies an
extra cost for stabilizing the financial system, i.e. the regulator needs extra
resources to hedge against the insolvency risk. Therefore, a counter-cyclical
deposit insurance mechanism will work. The proposal is as follows: the
banks have to be taxed away part of their revenue in the good state and the
taxation revenue can be used to cover the cost in central bank’s liquidity
provision in the bad state.
It is worth mentioning equity requirements, as typical solution in the case of
pure insolvency risk, is suboptimal as well. The co-existence of two banking
plagues means higher capital ratio, hence higher cost, should be imposed
for banking industry.
Since it’s hard to catch two rabbits at the same time, it might be optimal
to combine the advantages of several instruments. A hybrid regulatory
scheme is therefore proposed in this paper, allowing liquidity regulation to
discourage the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium (which leads to liquidity
shortage) and equity requirement to absorb the loss from insolvency.
1.2 Review of literature
This paper is an extension of the baseline model from the previous work
by Cao & Illing (2008, 2009a, 2009b). It has been shown that when there is
only pure illiquidity risk, there’s an incentive for a financial institution to
free-ride on liquidity provision from the others, resulting in excessively low
liquidity in bad states. Since illiquidity is the only risk, conditional (with
ex ante liquidity requirements for banks’ entry to the financial market), a
liquidity injection from the central bank fully eliminates the risk of bank
runs when bad states are less likely, and the outcome of such conditional
bailout policy dominates that of capital requirements since the banks have
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to incur a substantially high cost of holding equity in order to fully stabilize
the system. However, one may ask what happens if there’s an additional
risk of insolvency. Indeed, when insolvency is mixed with illiquidity and
market participants cannot distinguish between the two, banks would have
difficulties in raising sufficient liquidity using their assets as collateral. This
may have profound impacts on both equilibrium outcomes and policy im-
plications, and exploring these issues is the main task of this paper.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two respects:
(1) This paper addresses the systemic liquidity risk as an endogenous
phenomenon arising from the joint illiquidity-insolvency problem;
(2) Central bank intervention and banking regulation are examined under
nominal, instead of real, contracts.
Although illiquidity and insolvency problems respectively have been inten-
sively studied in the banking literature, the endogenous systemic liquidity
risk arising from the co-existence of both problems has been rarely inves-
tigated. Most past works that analyze these two problems in one model
mainly focus on how banking crises evolve, rather than why the banking
industry arrives at the brink of collapse. Therefore, liquidity shortage is
usually introduced as an exogenous shock, instead of a strategic outcome.
For example, Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000, 2004) model systemic liquid-
ity risk out of coordinative failure from the interbank market. In their model,
a banking crisis may be triggered by an exogenous insolvency shock; there-
fore, closing insolvent banks helps cut off the contagion chain and save the
system. Taking liquidity risk as (partially) exogenously given works well for
understanding the development of banking crisis, however, one has to be
cautious when applying these models on banking regulation. As is stated in
Acharya (2009), ”... Such partial equilibrium approach has a serious short-
coming from the standpoint of understanding sources of, and addressing,
inefficient systemic risk... ” In other words, if we admit that it is equally
important to establish proper regulatory rules ex ante as it is to bailout the
failing banks ex post, it should be equally crucial to ask what causes the fail-
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ure as to tell how severe the crisis can be, i.e. systemic liquidity risk should
be an endogenous phenomenon.
It seems that an increasing number of recent works start analyzing endoge-
nous incentives for systemic risk. Acharya (2009) and Acharya & Yorul-
mazer (2008) define such incentive as the correlation of portfolio selection,
i.e. when the return of a bank’s investment has a ”systemic factor”, the
failure of one bank conveys negative information about this factor, which
makes the market participants worry about the health of the entire bank-
ing industry, increasing the bank’s probability to fail. The concern of such
”informational spillover” induces the banks to herd ex ante, leading to an
inefficiently high correlation in the banks’ portfolio choices. These insights
are similar in spirit (but quite different in modelling) as in this paper (for ex-
ample, the inefficiently high correlation corresponds to the mixed strategy
equilibrium and public information about the early returns means perfect
informational spillover); however, since illiquidity problem is not explic-
itly modelled in their works, liquidity regulation doesn’t play any role (in
contrast to this paper).
Recent endogenous approaches to modelling systemic liquidity risk include
Wagner (2009), in which inefficiency comes from the externalities of bank
runs), Korinek (2008, in which inefficiency comes from the fact that financial
institutions don’t internalize the impact of asset prices on the production
sector), etc. However, to the best of my knowledge, works addressing joint
illiquidity-insolvency problem and its impact on macro policy still seem to
be rare, if not absent. In this sense, this paper contributes to understanding
this new feature and the lessons for banking regulation.
The mostly closely related work is probably the model considered in Bolton,
Santos and Scheinkman (2009a, a.k.a. BSS as in the following). The feature
that the market participants can hardly distinguish between illiquidity and
insolvency is captured in their model, while they mainly focus on the supply
side of liquidity, i.e. liquidity from financial institutions’ own cash reserve
(inside liquidity) or from the proceeds from asset sales to the other investors
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with longer time preference (outside liquidity), and the timing perspective of
liquidity trading. This paper takes BSS’s view that (outside) liquidity short-
age arises from the banks’ coordinative failure, but the timing of liquidity
trading is not going to be my focus. Rather, I provide a different explanation
of systemic liquidity risk, i.e. liquidity under-provision may come from the
banks’ incentive of free-riding on each others’ liquidity supply, which is not
covered in BSS (in which they restrict attentions to pure strategy equilibria);
and clear-cut results from a more compact and flexible model in this paper
lead to clear-cut policy implications. What’s more, since financial contracts
in BSS are real, they (BSS, 2009b) conclude that efficiency can be restored by
central banks’ credible supporting (real) asset prices. However, in reality,
instead of redirecting real resources to the financial sector, central banks can
only increase the supply of fiat money and support the nominal prices. If we
take this into account, nominal liquidity injection from central banks may
crowd out market liquidity supply without improving efficiency, therefore
policy makers should take a more careful view on designing regulatory
rules and bailout policies.
In the banking literature, a related inside-outside liquidity approach has
been explored in Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1998, 2008), etc. (although their
focuses and methodologies are quite different from those in this paper).
These papers argue that since private liquidity supply is inefficient, public
provision of emergency (real) liquidity as a pure public good improves
allocations in the presence of aggregate shocks. However, central banks
usually lack the capability of redirecting the economy’s real resources to
the financial sector via lump sum taxation; instead, more likely they can
only achieve redistribution through nominal instruments. This view is in
line with Allen & Gale (1998), in which public liquidity intervention works
through nominal contracts and the price level is adjusted via cash-in-the-
market principle. Diamond & Rajan (2006) explores this mechanism further.
However, unlike this paper it focuses on monetary policy in banking crisis
— liquidity shocks are, thus, taken as exogenously given.
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1.3 Structure of the paper
S 2 presents the baseline model with real deposit contracts. S
2.1 shows the equilibrium when liquidity and solvency shocks are both
deterministic. Then S 2.2 extends the results to the case of uncertainty
in the types of shocks. S 2.3 describes the equilibria of such laissez-
faire economy. The failure of liquidity regulation is analyzed in S 3.1,
and an alternative scheme with additional taxation is proposed. It is shown
in S 4 that equity requirements become too costly in the presence of
both illiquidity and insolvency problems, therefore an improved regulatory
scheme combining liquidity regulation and minimum level of capital ratio
is discussed. S 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section the deposit contracts are restricted to be real, i.e., the central
bank as a fiat money issuer is absent in the game. The model is almost
the same as that from Cao & Illing (2008); the differences are (1) the payoff
structure of the risky assets; (2) the information. The basic elements of the
game are summarized in Table 1 and Fig. 1
Agents with different time preferences There are three types of risk neu-
tral agents: a continuum of investors (each endowed with unit of re-
sources), N banks (operated by bank managers or bankers, engaging in
Bertrand competition) and a continuum of entrepreneurs. Impatient in-
vestors want to consume one period after investing their endowments,
while entrepreneurs and bank managers are indifferent between consum-
ing early or late;
Technologies Investors only have access to an inferior storage technology
(therefore, as described in Cao & Illing (2008) they will take the deposit
contract if the expected gross return rate from the deposit is higher than 1).
There are two types of entrepreneurs with different projects: safe (liquid)
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Table 1
The basic elements of the extended model: Agents, technologies, and preferences
Investors • Unit t = 0 endowment — stored or invested in projects;
• Investors want to consume at t = 1.
Entrepreneurs • With type 1 project
— Return R1 > 1, safely realized at t = 1;
• With type 2 project
— Highest return R2 > R1, risky. It may return at t = 1,
· but also may be delayed to t = 2, or
· fail with zero return.
Banks • Engage in Bertrand competition;
• Expertise to collect 0 < γ < 1 from projects return;
• Offer deposit contracts
— Commitment device not to abuse the expertise, and
— Making banking industry fragile;
• Risk of bank runs: poor liquidation return 0 < c < 1.
projects returning R1 > 1 for sure at t = 1, risky (illiquid) projects as
explained later. Bank managers have the expertise in collecting a share γ
of the projects’ return — a motivation for intermediation;
Timing At t = 0 banks compete for investors by providing a take-it-or-
leave-it deposit contract
(
αi, di0
)
in which αi is the share of bank i’s invest-
ments on safe projects and di0 the promised t = 1 return for investors. The
illiquid projects’ riskiness is unknown at t = 0 but partially revealed at
t = 12 , at which time the investors decide whether to run the banks or
wait till t = 1. In the case of a run, both safe and risky projects have to be
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liquidated with a poor return 0 < c < 1;
Limited liability All the financial contracts only have to be met with the
debtors’ entire assets. For the deposit contracts between investors and
banks, when a bank run happens only the early withdrawers can get
promised di0 with the bank’s run value; for the liquidity contracts be-
tween banks and entrepreneurs at t = 1, although in equilibrium the
contracted interest rate is bid up by the competing banks to the level
that the entrepreneurs seize all the return from the risky projects in the
good state of the world at t = 2 (the details will be explained later), the
entrepreneurs cannot claim more than the actual yields in the bad state. 
Timing of the model:      
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Fig. 1. The timing of the game
Here the risky project has the following special features, as shown in Fig. 1
(1) With probability p the project returns early. For projects with early
returns
(a) With probability η the return is as high as R2;
(b) With probability 1 − η the return is as low as 0;
(2) With probability 1 − p the project returns late. For projects with late
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returns
(a) With probability η the return is as high as R2;
(b) With probability 1 − η the return is as low as 0.
p can take three values, pL < p < pH. η can take three values as well,
ηL < η < ηH. Assume that ηR2 > R1 such that the expected return for each
unit of risky asset invested at t = 0 is higher than the that for safe asset.
At t = 12 , p · η, or the early return from the risky projects, becomes public in-
formation. However, no player, even the bank managers themselves, knows
the exact values of p and η. Further, assume that there can be only one shock
at t = 1, i.e. it’s only possible that either p or η takes its ”extreme” value, but
not both. For simplicity, assume there are only two possible values for p · η
and (p · η)L = p · ηL = η · pL < p · ηH = η · pH = (p · η)H. The higher early return,
(p · η)H, occurs with probability pi and the lower early return, (p · η)L, occurs
with probability 1 − pi. Therefore,
(1) If one observes a high p·η, it may comes from either pH (with probability
σ) or ηH (with probability 1 − σ);
(2) If one observes a low p ·η, it may comes from either pL (with probability
σ) or ηL (with probability 1 − σ).
Such p - η setting captures the dual concerns in banking industry. p defines
how likely the cash flow is materialized earlier, i.e. the liquidity of the risky
projects, and η defines how successful the projects are — or, how likely the
banks stay solvent.
In the following, we first analyze the baseline case in which there’s no
uncertainty concerning the values of p and η. Then the model is extended
to the case in which the true reason for a liquidity shock is not discernable.
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2.1 The baseline result (when p and η are deterministic)
Suppose that both p and η are deterministic. In this case, the expected return
for each unit of risky asset invested at t = 0 is
E [R2] = pηR2 + (1 − p)ηR2 = ηR2.
Then for each unit deposit the bank manager collects, her liability to her
depositors is
αγR1 + (1 − α)γE [R2] = αγR1 + (1 − α)γηR2;
and at t = 1 the aggregate liquidity available is
αR1 + (1 − α) pηR2.
The optimal symmetric equilibrium is therefore given by the α that equates
these two terms, i.e.
αγR1 + (1 − α)γηR2 = αR1 + (1 − α) pηR2.
Solving, we obtain
α =
γ − p
(γ − p) + (1 − γ) R1ηR2
=
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1ηR2(γ−p)
. (1)
When η = 1, i.e. no insolvency risk, equation (1) degenerates to the baseline
case in Cao & Illing (2008). It can be seen that ∂α∂η > 0, i.e. when insolvency
is less severe, illiquidity problem dominates so that more funds should be
invested on the safe assets; similarly, since ∂α∂p < 0, more funds should be
invested on the safe assets when the long term projects get riskier.
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2.2 Introducing aggregate risk (when p and η are stochastic)
Now suppose that at t = 12 , the value p · η is stochastic, i.e. either (p · η)H or
(p · η)L is observed. Then (p · η)H reveals
• If the true state is pH with η, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − pH) ηR2;
• If the true state is ηH with p, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − p) ηHR2.
So the expected return at t = 2 is given by
RH2 =
[(
1 − pH) ησ + (1 − p) ηH(1 − σ)] R2
=
[
ησ +
(
1 − p − σ) ηH] R2
= [
(
1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηH − η)︸   ︷︷   ︸
>0
]R2, (2)
and the aggregate expected return from the risky projects is
E
[
R2|(p · η)H] = (p · η)HR2 + [(1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηH − η)]R2. (3)
Similarly when (p · η)L is observed at t = 12 , then
• If the true state is pL with η, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − pL) ηR2;
• If the true state is ηL with p, then the expected return from the late risky
projects at t = 2 is
(
1 − p) ηLR2.
So the expected return from the late risky projects at t = 2 is given by
RL2 =
[(
1 − pL) ησ + (1 − p) ηL(1 − σ)] R2
=
[
ησ +
(
1 − p − σ) ηL] R2
= [
(
1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηL − η)︸  ︷︷  ︸
<0
]R2, (4)
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and the aggregate expected return from the risky projects is
E
[
R2|(p · η)L] = (p · η)LR2 + [(1 − p) η + (1 − p − σ) (ηL − η)]R2. (5)
To make our analysis interesting, assume that
E
[
R2|(p · η)H]>E [R2|(p · η)L] ,
(p · η)H − (p · η)L > (1 − p − σ) (ηL − ηH).
If there’s only illiquidity risk as in Cao & Illing (2008, 2009a), the expected
return from the late risky projects is just R2 (the only thing that matters is
the timing of cash flow). Now with co-existence of insolvency risk, such
return is determined by the probability and scale of insolvency, as (2) and
(4) suggest:
(1) In good time, the confidence in the risky assets (less likely to be insol-
vent) raises future expected return (hence asset price at t = 1);
(2) In bad time, the lack of confidence in the risky assets (more likely to be
insolvent) depresses future expected return (hence asset price at t = 1).
2.3 Equilibria for the laissez-faire economy
Suppose that (p · η)H is the only intermediate state of the world and all the
bank managers set their α, call it αH, according to that. Then the equilibrium
should be the αH under which the banks get the cheapest liquidity without
bank runs, i.e.
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)H]=γ {αHR1 + (1 − αH)E [R2|(p · η)H]}︸                                   ︷︷                                   ︸
E[RH]
=αHR1 + (1 − αH) (p · η)HR2
αH =
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1
γE[R2|(p·η)H]−(p·η)HR2
.
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Similar as in Cao & Illing (2008), assume that γE
[
R2|(p · η)H] > (p · η)HR2 to
ensure that banks need to hold both liquid and illiquid assets.
If (p·η)L is the only intermediate state of the world and all the bank managers
set their α, call it αL, according to that, then
αL =
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1
γE[R2|(p·η)L]−(p·η)LR2
.
Similar as before, assume that γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] > (p · η)LR2.
To simplify the notation in the following, denote
E [RH] = αHR1 + (1 − αH)E [R2|(p · η)H] ,
as well as
E [RL] = αLR1 + (1 − αL)E [R2|(p · η)L] .
The equilibria for the laissez-faire economy are then summarized in the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 2.1 The equilibria for the laissez-faire economy depend on the value
of pi, such that
(1) There is a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies such
that all the banks set α∗ = αH as long as the probability of (p · η)H satisfies
pi > pi2 =
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c . In addition,
(a) At t = 0 the banks offer the investors a deposit contract with d0 = γE [RH];
(b) The banks survive at (p · η)H, but experience a run at (p · η)L;
(c) The investors’ expected return is E [R (αH, c)] = pid0 + (1 − pi)c;
(2) There exists a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies such
that all the banks set α∗ = αL as long as the probability of (p · η)H satisfies
0 ≤ pi < pi1 = γE[RL]−cγE[R2|(p·η)L]−c . In addition,
(a) At t = 0 the banks offer the investors a deposit contract with d0 = γE [RL];
(b) The banks survive at both (p · η)H and (p · η)L;
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(c) The investors’ expected return is E [R (αL)] = d0;
(d) At (p·η)H the bank managers get a rent ofγ(1−αL) (E [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L])
for each unit of deposit;
(3) When pi ∈ [pi1, pi2] there exists no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
What’s more, there exists a unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which for a
representative bank manager
(a) With probability θ the bank chooses to be a free-rider — those who set
α∗r = 0, offer high return for investors at (p · η)H and are run at (p · η)L;
and with probability 1 − θ to be prudent — those who set α∗s > 0 and
survive both (p · η)H and (p · η)L;
(b) At t = 0 a naughty bank offers a deposit contract with higher re-
turn dr0 = γ
[
(p · η)HR2 + R
H
2
rH
]
, but the banks is run when (p · η)L is
observed; a prudent bank offers a deposit contract with lower return
ds0 = γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)HR2 + (1−α
∗
s)RH2
rH
]
, but the banks survive in
both states;
(c) The expected returns for both types are equal, i.e. pidr0 + (1 − pi)c = ds0,
and the probability θ is determined by market clearing condition, which
equates liquidity supply and demand in both states;
(d) The expected returns for prudent banks are equal at both states. Especially,
at (p · η)L,
ds0 = min
{
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2, γ [α∗sR1 + (1 − α∗s) (p · η)LR2
+
(
1 − α∗s
)
RL2
]}
.
Moreover, rL = 1 with α∗s ≥ αL when
ds0 = γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2 + (1 − α∗s) RL2] ;
and rL ≥ 1 with α∗s ≤ αL when
ds0 = α
∗
sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2.
α∗s = αL only when
γ
[
α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2 + (1 − α∗s) RL2]
=α∗sR1 +
(
1 − α∗s
)
(p · η)LR2.
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Proof See A A.1.
So far the results seem to be similar as those in Cao & Illing (2008). Although
the ambiguity between illiquidity and insolvency problems makes four
states of the world at t = 2, namely
(
pH, η
)
,
(
ηH, p
)
,
(
pL, η
)
, and
(
ηL, p
)
, only
two signals are actually observed in t = 1. As long as the equilibria are still
driven by just two t = 1 signals, the outcomes should be of similar pattern.
The difference here lies in the mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e. what P-
 2.1 (3d) shows. Recall that in the presence of pure illiquidity risks,
the expected return of the risky assets remains the same (i.e. R2) in both
states because the only problem there is the timing of getting the frac-
tions of the yields. But if there are additional insolvency risks as in current
settings, the expected return of the risky assets differs in both states, i.e.
E
[
R2|(p · η)L] < E [R2|(p · η)H] as shown in equations (3) and (5). Therefore at
(p · η)H there’s a trade-off for prudent banks now:
(1) (p · η)H implies a lower probability of insolvency at t = 2, therefore the
value of risky assets gets higher. With higher net worth of illiquid assets,
the banks are able to pledge more liquidity in liquidity market (hence,
offer higher ds0 at t = 0). Such ”income effect” encourages prudent banks
to set higher α∗s;
(2) (p · η)H implies higher early return from the risky projects, making it
easier to fulfill ds0. Such ”substitution effect” discourages prudent banks
to set higher α∗s.
The equilibrium value α∗s then depends on the cost of the banks’ liquidity
financing at t = 1, i.e. the interest rate rH. Since rH is bid up by the free-riders,
or the naughty banks, its value reflects the incentive for free-riding, which
hinges on the probability of being in a good state, pi
(1) When pi is just a bit higher than pi1, the profitability of free-riding is not
much higher than being prudent. Therefore, there won’t be many free-
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riders and rH won’t be that high. The prudent banks can thus pledge
more liquidity with their risky assets, i.e. they can get higher early
return while they need less high yield risky assets to fulfill ds0. In this
case ”substitution effect” dominates and prudent banks will choose to
set a higher α∗s;
(2) When pi is much higher than pi1, the profitability of free-riding is much
higher than being prudent. Therefore, there will be many free-riders
and rH will be high. The prudent banks thus cannot pledge more liq-
uidity with their risky assets, i.e. they have to fulfill ds0 by competing
for liquidity. In this case ”income effect” dominates and prudent banks
will choose to set a lower α∗s.
The investors’ expected return in equilibrium as a function of pi is summa-
rized in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Investors’ expected return in laissez-faire economy
To summarize, when the liquidity and insolvency problem coexist, the in-
efficiencies arise from: (1) the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium — the
investors’ expected return is lower whenever α∗s , αL, ∀pi ∈ [pi1, pi2] and (2)
the costly bank runs. However, as the next section shows, when it comes to
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banking regulation, typical (one-handed) schemes may be no longer optimal
and may even become infeasible when insolvency is present.
3 Liquidity regulation, nominal contract and Lender of Last Resort pol-
icy
We now introduce a central bank as a fourth player. Banks are required to
invest a minimum level α on safe projects, and only those who observe the
rules of the game will be offered the lifeboat when there’s liquidity shortage.
Liquidity injection is implemented via creating fiat money, and the timing
of the game is summarized as Fig. 3. The key elements in this section are as
following:
Nominal contracts Since central banks don’t produce real goods, rather,
they increase liquidity supply by printing fiat money at zero cost, therefore
in this section all financial contracts have to be nominal, i.e. one unit of
money is of equal value to one unit real good in payment and central
bank’s liquidity injection inflates the nominal price by cash-in-the-market
principle a` la Allen & Gale (2004) — the nominal price is equal to the ratio
of amount of liquidity (the sum of money and real goods) in the market
to amount of real goods;
Liquidity regulation At t = 0 a minimum level α of investment on safe
projects is announced by the central bank;
Conditional entry and bailout In the following, liquidity requirement α is
both a requirement for entry to the banking industry and a prerequisite
for receiving liquidity injection.
3.1 Liquidity regulation with conditional bailout
Recall that, in the presence of pure illiquidity risk, liquidity injection elim-
inates the costly bank run, reducing inefficiency, as Cao & Illing (2009a)
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Fig. 3. The timing of the game with central bank
suggests. Suppose the same policy is applied: at t = 0 all banks are required
to invest α = αH whenpi > pi2, and will be bailed out by the liquidity injected
against their assets as collateral when necessary. Then when (p ·η)H is indeed
observed, the banks can meet the depositors’ demand without the need for
liquidity injection, i.e.
d0 = αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)H] .
However, when (p · η)L is observed, the nominal contract on d0 cannot be
met purely by the banks’ expected real return so that they need to apply for
central bank’s liquidity injection using their assets as collateral. However,
since there’s a positive probability that the banks may be insolvent, the
central bank can only inject liquidity up to the fair value of the the risky
projects, i.e. the expected return of the risky assets, or, in this case, the
maximum nominal payoff the depositors can get
d0|(p·η)L =αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] (6)
< d0
— the banks will still be run even if they obtain the promised lifeboat from
the central bank, and the outcome is no different from that in the laissez-faire
economy. The scheme fails to eliminate the inefficient bank runs for pi > pi2,
and the outcome is the same as that in the laissez-faire economy.
For 0 ≤ pi ≤ pi2, the liquidity requirement should be α = αL. Since α is
also the entry requirement for the entire banking industry, it is no longer
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possible to free-ride for intermediate values ofpi; the inferior mixed strategy
equilibrium is thus eliminated, which improves efficiency. On the other
hand, banks survive on both contingencies by setting α = αL, so there will
be no need for liquidity injection.
With both illiquidity and insolvency risk, this scheme can only eliminate
the inefficiency from the mixed strategy equilibrium (by imposing liquidity
requirement α = αL for 0 ≤ pi ≤ pi2), but fails to avoid the high cost from
bank runs. In this case, it’s effectiveness is rather limited.
3.2 Conditional liquidity injection with procyclical taxation
The failure of this scheme comes from the following fact: the insolvency risk
brings a wedge between the expected return of the late risky projects at (p·η)H
and that at (p · η)L; therefore, even if the banks are guaranteed a liquidity
injection when time is bad, they are not able to obtain as much liquidity
as they need — in other words, the potential insolvency risk adds an extra
cost to stabilizing the financial system. This suggests that the regulator
needs to find a second instrument for covering such cost, for example, an
additional procyclical taxation may help solve this problem by imposing a
tax at t = 0 on the banks’ revenue when (p · η)H is observed, and bailing out
the troubled banks with liquidity injection plus such a tax revenue when
(p · η)L is observed.
The proposed augmented scheme works as follows. At t = 0, a minimum
liquidity requirement, the minimum share αT of the funds invested on the
safe projects, is imposed on all banks and at t = 1 the banks are taxed away
a certain amount TH ≥ 0 out of their revenue when (p · η)H is observed. The
banks are bailed out with liquidity injection (with their assets as collateral)
plus the tax revenue when (p ·η)L is observed — surely in this case the banks
pay no tax, TL = 0.
αT and TH are determined by pi, i.e. regulatory policies are only introduced
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where there are inefficiencies
(1) For pi ≥ pi2, a positive tax TH > 0 is levied at (p · η)H and the revenue is
used as bailout funds at (p ·η)H. Bank managers have to set (αH,T, d0,T) at
t = 0 by internalizing TH as an additional cost at t = 1. In this case, costly
bank run is the source of inefficiency which is to be entirely eliminated
by the conditional liquidity injection and the tax;
(2) For 0 ≤ pi ≤ pi1, banks are required to set αT = αL as an entry condition.
Since the inefficient mixed strategy equilibrium is deterred by imposing
such obligation, and the banks always survive in this case, no safety
funds are necessary. Therefore, TH = 0.
Now we have to examine whether this scheme works; and if yes, how much
TH should be imposed. Let’s concentrate on the case where TH > 0, i.e.
pi ≥ pi2. (αH,T, d0,T) is set by
αH,TγR1 +
(
1 − αH,T)γE [R2|(p · η)H] − TH =αH,TR1 + (1 − αH,T) (p · η)HR2
= d0,T. (7)
The liquidity requirement αT should be so high that the banks are just able
to utilize the resources optimally (as equation (7) shows), i.e. αT = αH,T, and
the conditional bailout policy must make sure that the banks are not to be
run in the worst case, i.e.
αH,TγR1 +
(
1 − αH,T)γE [R2|(p · η)H] − TH
=αH,TγR1 +
(
1 − αH,T)γE [R2|(p · η)L] + TH pi1 − pi. (8)
αH,T, d0,T, and TH are determined by solving equations (7) and (8)

αH,T =
(p·η)HR2−γpiE[R2|(p·η)H]+γpiE[R2|(p·η)L]−γE[R2|(p·η)L]
γR1−R1+(p·η)HR2−γpiE[R2|(p·η)H]−γE[R2|(p·η)L]+γpiE[R2|(p·η)L] ,
d0,T = − γR1{pi(E[R2|(p·η)H]−E[R2|(p·η)L])+E[R2|(p·η)L]−(p·η)HR2}γR1−R1+(p·η)HR2−γpiE[R2|(p·η)H]−γE[R2|(p·η)L]+γpiE[R2|(p·η)L] ,
TH =
γR1(pi−1)(1−γ)(E[R2|(p·η)H]−E[R2|(p·η)L])
γR1−R1+(p·η)HR2−γpiE[R2|(p·η)H]−γE[R2|(p·η)L]+γpiE[R2|(p·η)L] .
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To get rid of complications, further assume that γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] > (p · η)HR2,
i.e. even in the worst case, it is still appealing for the banks to hold both
liquid and illiquid assets.
The effectiveness of the scheme is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1 When pi ≥ pi2, with αT as both the requirement for entry to
the banking industry and a prerequisite for getting liquidity injection from the
central bank, as well as an additional tax TH charged at (p · η)H as safety funds
for rescuing banks at (p · η)H, the required αT should be so high that αT > αH and
the corresponding investors’ expected return is (weakly) higher than that in the
laissez-faire economy under the same pi, as long as c is sufficiently small.
Proof See A A.2.
The intuition behind the proposition is fairly straightforward. The gain
from such modified scheme is to avoid the costly bank runs, however, the
scheme also adds additional direct and indirect costs for banking business.
The direct one comes from TH, the ”safety funds” to make up the losses
in bad time as equation (8) shows, i.e. to distribute the tax revenue in the
downturn, TH pi1−pi ; the indirect one comes from αH,T — at t = 0 the banks
have to invest more on the safe projects to pay the tax at t = 1, leaving
less resources for risky, but high yield projects. When pi is sufficiently high
and the bad state seldom happens, the regulator doesn’t need to charge too
high TH and the regulatory cost is comparatively lower than the economy’s
gain from the regulation, and this is more likely to hold when the gain from
avoiding bank runs (i.e. when c is sufficiently small) is sufficiently large.
Fig. B.1 (A B) visualizes the results by numerical simulation. When
the cost of bank runs is fairly high (too low c), this scheme significantly
improves efficiency when pi is high, where TH doesn’t need to be high and
the opportunity cost from investing on higher αH,T is much lower than the
gain from completely avoiding bank runs.
However, in reality such safety funds via procyclical taxation are certainly
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subject to implementation difficulties. The funds have to be accumulated to
a sufficient amount before they are in need, i.e. when a crisis hits. Otherwise,
when a crisis comes before the funds are fully established, the government
must face a public deficit which can only be covered by the future taxation
revenue. Usually raising public deficits implies political debates and com-
promises, substantially restricting the effectiveness of such scheme. In this
sense, a ”self-sufficient” solution such as equity holding may be superior,
which is to be studied in the next section.
4 Insolvency risk and equity requirement
As seen above, with the coexistence of both illiquidity and insolvency risks,
the scheme of liquidity requirement with conditional bailout only works
if an additional cost is introduced. Such cost can be either ”external”, for
example, establishing safety funds via taxation as the past section suggested,
or ”internal”, for example, covering the cost with equity holdings. In current
settings, introducing equity requirement may not be as costly as in Cao
& Illing (2009a) since the cheaper stabilizing instrument there ceases to
work here. Therefore, compared with the bigger cost caused by bank runs,
imposing a costly equity requirement may be the lesser of two evils.
4.1 Pure equity requirement and narrow banking
Now suppose an equity requirement is adopted as a sole instrument for the
regulator to stabilize financial system in a self-sufficient way, i.e. all the losses
will be absorbed by equity holders. Here equity is introduced a` la Diamond
& Rajan (2005) such that the banks issue a mixture of deposit contract and
equity for the investors. Assume that the equity holders (investors) and
the bank managers share the profit equally (that is, to set ζ in Cao & Illing
(2009a) to be 0.5), i.e. in the good time the level of equity k is
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k =
γE[RH]−d0,E
2
γE[RH]−d0,E
2 + d0,E
, d0,E =
1 − k
1 + k
γE [RH] .
The minimum equity requirement k should make the banks just able to
survive from bank runs in the worst contingency, i.e. all the equity is wiped
out when (p · η)L is observed,
1 − k
1 + k
γE [RH] = αHR1 + (1 − αH) (p · η)LR2︸                          ︷︷                          ︸
E[RH |(p·η)L]
= d0,E, (9)
or,
k =
γE [RH] − d0,E
γE [RH] + d0,E
.
Since ∂k∂(p·η)L < 0 by equation (9), banks need higher equity ratio to survive in
the worst contingency when both (or either) of the two plagues get(s) more
severe, implying a higher regulatory cost.
Fig. B.2 (A B) visualizes the results by numerical simulation. Again,
as Cao & Illing (2009a) shows, holding equity is costly when pi is high (i.e.
less funds are available for the risky assets with relatively safe, high yields,
although costly bank runs are completely eliminated). Holding equity may
be superior to the mixed strategy equilibrium of a laissez-faire economy de-
pending on parameter values, but is inferior to conditional liquidity injection
with procyclical taxation — because taxation revenue is entirely returned
to investors as bailout funds, while in the current scheme part of the profits
goes to bank managers as dividends. However, concerning the implemen-
tation difficulties of imposing an extra tax, this may be a necessary cost for
both investors and regulators.
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4.2 Combining equity requirement with liquidity regulation
Liquidity requirements with conditional liquidity injections work best with
pure illiquidity risk, but the scheme fails when there’s additional insolvency
risk. On the other hand, pure equity requirements are able to stabilize the
system under both settings at a relatively high cost. Now the question is: is
it possible to design a regulatory scheme that combines the advantages of
these two at a minimum cost?
The answer is yes. Consider the right hand side of equation (9). If the banks
are required to maintain the financial stability in a self-sufficient way, in all
contingencies the depositors can only receive the same expected return as
in the worst case, i.e. the total t = 1 liquidity when time is bad. However,
since there’s a positive probability that the risky assets are simply illiquid,
the expected future return from the risky assets can be higher, i.e. the ”fair”
value of the risky assets (as the right hand side of equation (6) shows)
is higher. Therefore, liquidity injection from the central bank enables the
banks to pledge for bailout funds up to the fair value of their late risky
assets. However, as we argued in S 3.1, 3.2, without imposing extra
costs such as taxation these bailout funds won’t be enough for the banks to
avoid the costly bank runs, as long as there’s still a positive probability that
the banks will be insolvent. The regulator can impose equity requirement
to cover this part of the cost. By doing so, since the banks need equity to
cover only part of the regulatory cost, it’ll be much less costly for the banks
to carry equity.
The proposed regulatory scheme is as follows. First, all the banks are re-
quired to invest αE = αH of their funds on safe assets at t = 0 for high pi,
and αE = αL for low pi (the cutoff value of pi is different from pi2, and we’ll
compute it later); second, all the banks are required to meet a minimum
equity ratio k′ for high pi 1 . The banks are bailed out by liquidity injection in
1 For sufficiently low pi the banks coordinate on the safe strategy, therefore there
will be no bank runs and no need for liquidity injection, hence no need for equity
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the form of fiat money provision when time is bad. In this case, the regulator
only needs to set k′ to fill in the gap after a liquidity injection when (p · η)L
is observed, i.e.
1 − k′
1 + k′
γE [RH] = αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L] (10)
in which k′ < k since the right hand side of (10) is higher than that of (9). Then
when (p · η)H is observed, the investors’ real expected return is 1−k′1+k′γE [RH].
However, when (p · η)L is observed, the investors’ real expected return is
E
[
RH|(p · η)L] (the right hand side of (9)) and the liquidity is injected for the
banks to meet the nominal deposit contract. Therefore, the investors’ real
expected return is
1 − k′
1 + k′
γE [RH]pi + (1 − pi)E [RH|(p · η)L]
=
{
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L]}pi + (1 − pi)E [RH|(p · η)L] . (11)
For sufficiently low pi the banks coordinate on the safe strategy, i.e. α∗ =
αE = αL, and the investors’ expected return is γE [RL]. It pays off for the
banks to choose αL instead of αH only if they get higher expected real return
than (11), i.e. when
γE [RL]>
1 − k′
1 + k′
γE [RH]pi + (1 − pi)E [RH|(p · η)L] ,
γE [RL]>
{
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L]}pi + (1 − pi)E [RH|(p · η)L] .(12)
The solution gives the cutoff value pi′2, which can be solved from (12) when
it holds with equality
pi′2 =
γE [RL] − E [RH|(p · η)L]
αHγR1 + (1 − αH)γE [R2|(p · η)L] − E [RH|(p · η)L] .
Fig. B.3 (A B) visualizes the results by numerical simulation. Such
hybrid scheme indeed effectively reduces regulatory costs in comparison
to cover the gap in bailout funds.
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to pure equity requirement, since the banks do not have to hold that much
equity to stabilize the system, i.e. regulator needs two instruments to deal
with two plagues.
Fig. B.4 (A B) compares the investors’ returns under all schemes.
Again, the outcome under conditional liquidity injection with procyclical
taxation is superior to all the others, since all the profits that are levied as
the safety tax will be entirely returned to the investors. However, when
the political cost is too high to impose an extra tax and raise public deficit,
combining the advantages of liquidity regulation and equity requirement is
the best self-sufficient scheme.
5 Conclusion
In the existing banking literature, illiquidity and insolvency shocks are usu-
ally insulated in the sense that market participants have perfect knowledge
about the type of the shock. This paper attempts to model the new feature
of modern finance that financial innovation makes it harder to tell whether
a financial institution is illiquid or insolvent. Such ambiguity doesn’t only
alter the equilibrium outcomes under a laissez-faire economy, but also sig-
nificantly complicates the regulator’s roadmaps.
In order to capture the core of the problem in a relatively tractable frame-
work, it is assumed that the only uncertainty in the economy is that market
participants cannot distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency shocks.
That is, when some intermediate signal, say, a negative shock if the inter-
mediate outcome has been observed, nobody can tell whether it’s because
more risky projects return late (a liquidity shock) or more risky projects fail
(a solvency shock). In this stage, when pricing the illiquid assets market
players have to take into account the risk that the financial institution is
going to be insolvent in the future. Therefore, such a price should be lower
than that in an economy under pure illiquidity risks where the only problem
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is the timing of return.
Though more complicated than the prototype model, the equilibrium out-
comes under a laissez-faire economy still look similar. When either of the
two signals has been observed in t = 1, there’s a price of liquidity associated
with it, i.e. the value of risky assets can be uniquely determined. Therefore,
the banks coordinate to be safe when the probability of a bad outcome is
too high, and to be risky otherwise. In the intermediate range, there’s a free-
riding incentive to exploit the excessive liquidity supply in the good state of
the world, and the outcome here is a prevailing mixed strategy equilibrium
with both prudent and naughty banks.
However, the mixed strategy equilibrium is made a bit different, compared
with the prototype model in Cao & Illing (2008), by the additional insolvency
risk. A good signal doesn’t only mean a higher intermediate output, but also
a lower risk of future insolvency which inflates the value of illiquid assets
and makes the banks able to pledge more liquidity in t = 1, and vice versa.
Therefore, the prudent banks have the trade-off between these two effects,
and the balance depends on the cost of funding, which is driven by the free-
riders. However, the strategic profiles of the banks in equilibrium deviate
from the coordinate solution which maximizes their expected payoffs, the
mixed strategy equilibrium is inferior, anyway.
Again the inefficiencies under current settings are the inferior mixed strategy
equilibrium, in which the free-riding behavior makes the banks worse off
than the case if the coordinate on the safe strategy, and the costly bank runs,
which are to be fixed by properly designed regulatory rules. However, with
the mixture of both illiquidity and insolvency risks, traditional regulatory
rules need to be carefully reviewed. First, it has been shown that in th current
setting, liquidity requirements with a conditional lender of last resort policy
(which was the optimal scheme when there’s only illiquidity risk) cease
to work. The reason is fairly straightforward: when the bad state occurs,
since there’s a risk that the banks in trouble may be insolvent in the future,
the price of the illiquidity assets is depressed. When the banks turn to
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the central bank for help, they cannot get sufficient liquidity because their
collateral, i.e. their illiquid assets, are not worth as much as in the good
state. Therefore, the banks will be run anyway even if they do observe the
liquidity requirements!
The fact that the illiquid assets are worth less in the bad state implies that, in
the presence of insolvency risk, an extra informational cost is needed for both
bailing out banks ex post and making regulatory rules ex ante. One solution
could be to set up a safety funds via procyclical taxation, as a complement
for conditional liquidity rules. The tax revenue, which is levied in the good
state, is used in the bad state to fill in the gap which is left by pure liquidity
injection. Under such scheme efficiency is improved: the costly bank runs
are thus entirely eliminated and the mixed strategy equilibrium is deterred
by the industry’s entry requirement. However, if crisis hits before the funds
are fully established, a public deficit has to be initiated. Considering the
political cost of increasing public deficit, it may be tricky to implement such
scheme in reality.
An alternative approach to covering the informational cost is the self-
sufficient way, i.e. the banking industry stabilize itself by issuing equities.
The investors and bank managers share the profit in the good state, but
the equity is eliminated in the bad state. As a regulatory requirement, the
minimum equity level to stabilize the economy is the amount which is just
sufficient to make the banks survive in the bad state. Due to the additional
informational rent, more equity is required under current settings; and since
holding equity is costly, the outcome is inferior to the market solution when
the probability of the bad state is very low.
Now it is known that equity holding is able to cushion the financial shocks
at a cost, and liquidity requirements together with conditional liquidity in-
jection are able to partly cover the liquidity shortage in economic downturn;
therefore, regulators may combine the advantages from both instruments to
achieve higher efficiency. Indeed, it is shown that given that banks observe
the liquidity requirement as well as the minimum equity holdings, they can
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pledge the liquidity from the central bank up to the value of their collaterals,
and the rest of the cost to stay solvent is shouldered by the shareholders;
and the corresponding outcome dominates the one under pure equity re-
quirement.
However, investors achieve the highest expected return under the scheme
of conditional liquidity injection with procyclical taxation because here the
profit taxed away in the good state will be fully refunded in the bad state,
instead of being pocketed by the bank managers under the schemes with
equity holdings. But self-sufficient schemes can be implemented at a much
lower political cost, which seem to be more attractive for regulators in reality.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of P 2.1
Proof Given that under current settings there are still two t = 1 states of the
world, the equilibria of the game can be easily constructed following the
same method as in the proofs for P ?? and ??of Cao & Illing (2008).
The only necessary step here is to clarify the mixed strategy equilibrium.
When (p · η)H reveals, the prudent banks get a high early return from their
risky assets, i.e (p · η)HR2. On the other hand, the value of the late assets,
RH2 , gets higher as well because of lower probability of insolvency and this
allows them to get more liquidity in the market at t = 1 with market rate
rH. So the trade-off for the prudent banks here is whether to invest more on
liquid assets (increase α∗s) or to invest more on illiquid assets (decrease α∗s),
and the reference point is αL.
The market rate rH is pinned down by t = 1 liquidity demand and supply,
and these are jointly determined by the number of both prudent and naughty
banks (note that naughty banks only survive at (p · η)H), i.e.
(1) When rH is low, i.e. the free-riding incentive is not high, orpi is not high,
prudent banks are able to get market liquidity at a lower cost. Therefore,
there’s no need to invest in more illiquid assets and it’s preferable for
the prudent banks to reap the early harvest, i.e. α∗s > αL in this case.
And rL = 1 because of the overinvestment in liquid assets;
(2) When rH is high, i.e. the free-riding incentive is high, or pi is high,
prudent banks are no longer able to get market liquidity at a low cost.
Therefore, they have to invest in more illiquid assets to compete with
naughty banks on t = 1 market liquidity, i.e. α∗s < αL in this case. And
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rL > 1 because of the underinvestment in liquid assets. 2
A.2 Proof of P 3.1
Proof To show that αT > αH, we only have to show
(p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L] − γE [R2|(p · η)L]
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L]
>
1
1 + (1 − γ) R1
γE[R2|(p·η)H]−(p·η)HR2
,
simplify to get
{ −γpiE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] + piE [R2|(p · η)L] − piE [R2|(p · η)H]
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L]
+
−γE [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L] + γE [R2|(p · η)L] + E [R2|(p · η)H]
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L]
}
· γR1−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
> 0. (A.1)
It can be seen that
−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
=γ
(
R1 − E [R2|(p · η)H]) + ((p · η)HR2 − R1)
< 0, (A.2)
as well as
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L]
= R1(γ − 1) + ((p · η)HR2 − γE [R2|(p · η)L]) + γpi (E [R2|(p · η)L] − E [R2|(p · η)H])
< 0 (A.3)
since each term is negative. What’s more,
−γpiE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] + piE [R2|(p · η)L] − piE [R2|(p · η)H]
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−γE [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L] + γE [R2|(p · η)L] + E [R2|(p · η)H]
= (1 − pi)(1 − γ) (E [R2|(p · η)H] − E [R2|(p · η)L])
> 0
since each term is positive. Given that the sign of each part of inequality
(A.1)’s left hand side has been determined, it’s easily seen that inequality
(A.1) indeed holds.
To show that d0,T ≥ E [R (αH, c)] = pid0 + (1 − pi)c, we only have to show
d0,T − pid0 + (1 − pi)c ≥ 0. (A.4)
Define the left hand side of inequality (A.4) as a function of c, i.e.
g(c) = d0,T − pid0 + (1 − pi)c.
Insert the expressions for d0,T and d0, and evaluate g(c) at c = 0 and c = R1
respectively, one can get
g(0) =− 1−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
· 1
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L]
·
(
−R21γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + pi2γ2R1E2 [R2|(p · η)H] + R21γ(p · η)HR2 − R1γ(p · η)2HR22
+R21γE
[
R2|(p · η)L]pi − pi2γ2R1(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)H] + 2piγ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]
·E [R2|(p · η)L] + piγ2R21(p · η)HR2 − piγR21(p · η)HR2 − R1γE [R2|(p · η)L]pi(p · η)HR2
+R1γE
[
R2|(p · η)L]pi(p · η)HR2 + piγR1(p · η)2HR22 − piγ2R1(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)L]
+pi2γ2R1(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)L] − pi2γ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L]
−R1γ2E2 [R2|(p · η)H]pi + R1γ2(p · η)HR2E [R2|(p · η)H] − R21γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]pi
−R21γ2(p · η)HR2 − R1γ2E
[
R2|(p · η)L]E [R2|(p · η)H] + R21γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]) .
Inequality (A.2) shows that the first term, − 1−γE[R2|(p·η)H]+(p·η)HR2+γR1−R1 , is pos-
itive, and Inequality (A.3) shows that the second term,
1
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L] ,
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is negative. Further, the fact thatpi ≥ pi2 = γE[RL]−cγE[RH]−c implies that the third term
is non-positive as well. Therefore, g(0) ≥ 0.
Similarly, when c = R1
g (R1) =− 1−γE [R2|(p · η)H] + (p · η)HR2 + γR1 − R1
· 1
γR1 − R1 + (p · η)HR2 − γpiE [R2|(p · η)H] − γE [R2|(p · η)L] + γpiE [R2|(p · η)L]
·
(
−2R21γE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + 2pi2γ2R1E2 [R2|(p · η)H] + 2R21(p · η)HR2 − 2R31piγ
+R1pi(p · η)2HR22 − R21γ(p · η)HR2 − R1γ(p · η)2HR22 + 3R21γpiE
[
R2|(p · η)L]
+R31piγ
2 + R21γ
2E
[
R2|(p · η)H] − R21E [R2|(p · η)H]γ − pi2γ2R1R2(p · η)H
·E [R2|(p · η)H] + 4piγ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L] + R1γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]pi2
−R31γ2 − R21γ2pi2E
[
R2|(p · η)H] + R1R2γ(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)H] + piγ2R21R2(p · η)H
+piγR21R2(p · η)H − 3R1R2γpi(p · η)HE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + 2R1R2γ(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)L]
+piγR1R22(p · η)2H − piγ2R1R2(p · η)HE
[
R2|(p · η)L] + pi2γ2R1R2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)L]
−2pi2γ2R1E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L] + 2R31γ − R1R22(p · η)2H − R31 + R1R2γ
·pi2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)L] − R1R2γpi2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)H] − 2R1γ2piE2 [R2|(p · η)H]
+R1R2γ2(p · η)HE [R2|(p · η)H] + R31pi − 2R21R2pi(p · η)H − R21γpi2E [R2|(p · η)L]
+R21pi
2γE
[
R2|(p · η)H] − 3R21γ2piE [R2|(p · η)L] − R21R2γ2(p · η)H − 2R1γ2
·E [R2|(p · η)H]E [R2|(p · η)L] + 2R21γ2E [R2|(p · η)L]) .
The first two terms are the same as those in g (0), and the fact that pi ≥ pi2 =
γE[RL]−c
γE[RH]−c implies that the third term is non-negative. Therefore, g (R1) ≤ 0.
Since g(c) is continuous and monotone in c, then there exists a c0 ∈ [0,R1]
such that d0,T ≥ E [R (αH, c)], ∀c ∈ [0, c0]. 2
B Results of numerical simulations
The following figures present numerical simulations for various regulatory
schemes.
36

0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
1,0
1,1
1,2
1,3
1,4
1,5
π1 π2π
′
1
′a
Fig. B.1. Investors’ expected return in equilibrium: laissez-faire economy (solid blue
line) versus economy with conditional liquidity injection & procyclical taxation
(solid green line). Parameter values: (p · η)H = 0.36, (p · η)L = 0.24, γ = 0.6, R1 = 1.5,
R2 = 4, c = 0.3, η = 0.8, ηH = 0.9, ηL = 0.6, p = 0.4, pH = 0.45, pL = 0.3, σ = 0.5.
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